Key points

• Private security can match or exceed government performance when standards, oversight, and training are strong — sector identity is not the decisive variable.
• Operational advantages such as faster hiring, flexible staffing, and quicker adoption of new technologies often drive interest in private screening models across countries.
• The critical determinant of success is governance: clear performance requirements, rigorous oversight, and well-designed contracts matter far more than whether screeners are public or private.

Tampa International Airport (TPA) is one of three U.S. airports announcing intentions to shift from federally provided security screeners — supplied by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. agency responsible for airport screening — to private security screeners operating under federal oversight. It's a move that “not only reduces disruption risks caused by lapses in federal appropriations or government shutdowns but also allows greater flexibility to explore new screening checkpoint technology to enhance the customer experience,” according to TPA airport officials in its announcement.

TPA will be joined by airports in Charleston and Des Moines in adopting TSA’s new Gold+ model — a TSA run performance-upgrade program — while separately pursuing the option to use private screeners under TSA oversight. The choice of screening firm is also left to the TSA, with airports encouraged to participate in vendor selection, and TSA continues to set rigorous security standards.

The reaction — as reactions tend to be — has been loud and political, with some reactionary rhetoric invoking 9/11 to argue that any shift away from TSA screeners is inherently dangerous.

The response has been heated and political, but what does evidence actually suggest? Is this resistance grounded in evidence, or is it merely ideological pushback against reform?

To be sure, there are examples of private contractors performing poorly in critical assignments. Prior to the terrorist attacks in 2001 on 9/11, security in the U.S. was the responsibility of each individual airport, which tended to give contracts to the lowest bidders — and performance often followed this race-to-the-bottom logic. This pre-9/11 model bears little resemblance to the U.S. Screening Partnership Program framework, forged after 9/11, which operates under federal standards, federal testing, and federal oversight, but there have been isolated examples of underperformance in SPP (although the evidence is that these are much more the exception than the rule).  

The new Gold+ is only a TSA performance upgrade program, not a privatization model. But that hasn’t stopped opponents from portraying any move toward private screening as a step backward, despite what the data actually shows.

For many airports, the appeal of private screening is not ideological but operational: faster hiring, more flexible staffing, and the ability to adopt new screening technologies without waiting for federal procurement cycles.

What is the evidence?

Despite the intensity of the debate, there has been no comprehensive study comparing SPP airports utilizing private security screeners to TSA run airports across throughput, cost, and workforce stability — the three metrics that matter most to airport operators. But there have been evaluations as part of individual audits and case studies.

• ‍Throughput efficiency under private screening can be as good or better under the right conditions, according to research. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews of SPP airports have noted that several sites report shorter peak wait times and smoother processing during high volume periods, and audits of San Francisco International Airport’s long running SPP operation has repeatedly shown higher passenger satisfaction linked to faster throughput (GAO 15 612R — Screening Partnership Program: TSA's Cost and Performance Independent Study, GAO, June 2015). While not universal, these findings demonstrate that throughput efficiency is shaped more by staffing models, training, and local management flexibility than by whether screeners are federal or contracted.
• Cost comparisons between SPP airports and TSA-run airports remain fragmented, but available data suggests meaningful differences. The GAO’s analyses of SPP contracts show that several participating airports operate at a lower cost per passenger than comparable federalized screening operations, largely because private contractors can tailor staffing levels and shift structures more precisely to local demand. TSA’s own budget footprint, by contrast, reflects the constraints of a national workforce governed by federal pay scales, hiring rules, and staffing formulas.
• Workforce stability is the area where the contrast between private and federal screening is most pronounced. Government audits show that TSA’s average hiring timeline is approximately 252 days (TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Hire, Retain, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers, Dept. of Homeland Security, DHS OIG 18 78, March 2019). Private contractors, by comparison, typically hire within four to six weeks, allowing airports to respond more quickly to staffing shortages and seasonal demand. Case studies at SPP airports, including San Francisco International, also indicate lower turnover and higher training hours under some private contracts. Finally, retention remains problematic among government security screeners, with a recent government study noting that TSA officers' engagement — their sense of purpose on the job — has historically ranked among the lowest across the federal government and that gaps remain in identifying the root causes of officer dissatisfaction (Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Could Further Improve Officer Engagement, GAO-24-106052, Feb 2024). Taken together, these data points suggest that workforce stability — and the operational reliability that comes with it — is one of the strongest arguments for airports seeking greater control over their screening operations.

And on the most critical question — that of security performance — there is every indication that private security performance is comparable.

RAND — one of the world’s leading independent research institutes on security, defense, and public sector performance — finds that private security personnel can perform as well as or better than government agents when training and oversight are strong (The Role of Private Security in the 21st Century: Protecting the Public and Private Interests). Although not airport specific, RAND’s conclusion reinforces the broader point that performance is driven by program design rather than the public or private status of the workforce, an important lesson for governments around the world that might want to better leverage private security resources for sensitive security posts.

The GAO has likewise stressed variability in screening performance across airports. GAO’s red team testing and audits have shown inconsistent detection rates in TSA checkpoints, prompting congressional scrutiny. At the same time, GAO reviews of SPP airports have found no systemic safety decline where private screeners operate — concluding that private contractors ‘perform comparably to TSA’ on core screening metrics when contracts include clear performance standards and oversight. Finally, independent audits and internal reviews at San Francisco International, a SPP airport, have shown detection performance at least on par with TSA-run checkpoints.

It’s probably not a question of “who?” — but “how?”

The empirical record seems clearer than the rhetoric: when private screeners operate under rigorous standards, oversight, and contract design, the evidence shows they can match or even outperform government screeners on many operational measures. Perhaps the most vital questions for airports — and for policymakers around the world considering similar options in other security deployments — is not “public or private?” but “what rules and incentives will govern the switch?”

Private providers often adopt new screening technologies and operational innovations faster than large bureaucracies, a recurring finding in comparative reviews that can translate into better security outcomes and customer experience. But private provision is not a panacea and not all private contracts succeed, with examples of failures from every region of the world. Contracts that emphasize price over capability, lack oversight, or fail to establish sufficient training requirements produce poor outcomes.

Perhaps the most vital questions for airports — and for policymakers around the world considering similar options in other security deployments — is not “public or private?” but “what rules and incentives will govern the switch?”

Bottom line. The empirical record does not support a simple answer as to whether private security or government agents are “better.” Private screeners can be as effective — and sometimes more effective — than government screeners in airports and comparable public environments, but only when contracts, oversight, and training are designed to produce quality. The debate should therefore shift from ‘public or private?’ to the governance questions that actually determine outcomes: how contracts are awarded, what standards are enforced, and how performance is measured.

If airports, other critical infrastructure, and governments get those elements right, the evidence suggests the private model can be a viable, even superior option. If they don’t, then yes, switching holds potential for operational failure.

For lessons in procurement design from an extensive analysis of public tenders, see the Ligue's latest research, GSB Pulse: Public Procurement of Security Services (Europe).